

15-2513-cv(L)  
Moss v. First Premier Bank

1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
2 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

3 \_\_\_\_\_  
4  
5 August Term, 2015

6  
7 (Argued: April 8, 2016

Decided: August 29, 2016)

8  
9 Docket Nos. 15-2513-cv(L); 15-2667-cv(CON)

10  
11 \_\_\_\_\_  
12  
13 DEBORAH MOSS, on behalf of herself and  
14 all others similarly situated,

15  
16 *Plaintiff-Appellee,*

17  
18 v.

19  
20 FIRST PREMIER BANK, a South Dakota  
21 state-chartered bank, and BAY CITIES BANK,  
22 a Florida state-chartered bank,

23  
24 *Defendants-Appellants.*<sup>1</sup>

25  
26 \_\_\_\_\_  
27  
28 Before: POOLER, LIVINGSTON, and LOHIER, *Circuit Judges.*  
29

\_\_\_\_\_ <sup>1</sup> The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption as above.

1 Appeal from a July 16, 2015 order of the United States District Court for  
2 the Eastern District of New York (*Bianco, J.*), vacating a prior order compelling  
3 arbitration. The parties agreed to arbitrate their disputes before the National  
4 Arbitration Forum (“NAF”), which no longer accepts consumer arbitrations. The  
5 district court held that it could not appoint a substitute arbitrator because the  
6 language of the arbitration agreement contemplated arbitration only before NAF.  
7 We agree with the district court and therefore AFFIRM.

8 Affirmed.

9  
10 \_\_\_\_\_  
11 ERIC RIEDER, Bryan Cave LLP (Megan Awerdick  
12 Pierson, *on the brief*), New York, NY, *for Defendant-*  
13 *Appellant Bay Cities Bank.*

14 Bryan R. Freeman, Lindquist & Vennum LLP,  
15 Minneapolis, MN; Bryan Craig Meltzer, Herrick,  
16 Feinstein LLP, *for Defendant-Appellant First PREMIER*  
17 *Bank.*

18  
19 J. AUSTIN MOORE, Stueve Siegel Hanson LLP  
20 (Norman E. Siegel, Steve N. Nix, Stueve Siegel Hanson  
21 LLP; Darren T. Kaplan, New York, NY; Hassan  
22 Zavareei, Jeffrey D. Kaliel, Tycko & Zavareei,  
23 Washington, D.C., *on the brief*), Kansas City, MO, *for*  
24 *Plaintiff-Appellee.*  
25

1 POOLER, *Circuit Judge*:

2 Deborah Moss signed an arbitration agreement providing that any  
3 disputes between her and her payday lender would be resolved by arbitration  
4 before the National Arbitration Forum (“NAF”). When she tried to take her case  
5 to arbitration, however, NAF refused to accept it pursuant to a consent decree  
6 that prohibited NAF from accepting consumer arbitrations. The district court  
7 (*Bianco, J.*) construed the arbitration agreement as contemplating arbitration *only*  
8 before NAF and declined to compel Moss to arbitrate before a different  
9 arbitrator. We agree with the district court’s construction of the agreement and  
10 accordingly affirm.

11 **BACKGROUND**

12 Deborah Moss took out three payday loans from an online payday lender,  
13 SFS, Inc. (“SFS”). When a payday lender such as SFS agrees to loan a customer  
14 money, it relies on banks to serve as middlemen to debit the customer’s account.  
15 These banks are known as “Originating Depository Financial Institutions,” or  
16 “ODFIs.” First Premier Bank and Bay Cities Bank each served as an ODFI for one  
17 of Moss’s payday loans with SFS.

1           When Moss applied for the loans, she electronically signed an application  
2 that included an arbitration clause. The arbitration clause on one of the  
3 applications provided,

4           Arbitration of All Disputes: You and we agree that any and all  
5 claims, disputes or controversies between you and us, any claim by  
6 either of us against the other . . . and any claim arising from or  
7 relating to your application for this loan, regarding this loan or any  
8 other loan you previously or may later obtain from us, this Note,  
9 this agreement to arbitrate all disputes, your agreement not to bring,  
10 join or participate in class actions, regarding collection of the loan,  
11 alleging fraud or misrepresentation . . . including disputes regarding  
12 the matters subject to arbitration, or otherwise, shall be resolved by  
13 binding individual (and not joint) arbitration by and under the Code  
14 of Procedure of the National Arbitration Forum (“NAF”) in effect at  
15 the time the claim is filed. . . . Rules and forms of the NAF may be  
16 obtained and all claims shall be filed at any NAF office, on the  
17 World Wide Web at [aww.arb-forum.com](http://aww.arb-forum.com), by telephone at 800-474-  
18 2371, or at “National Arbitration Forum, P.O. Box 50191,  
19 Minneapolis, Minnesota 55405.” Your arbitration fees will be waived  
20 by the NAF in the event you cannot afford to pay them.

21 App’x at 168. The following notice is printed directly beneath the arbitration  
22 provision: “NOTICE: YOU AND WE WOULD HAVE HAD A RIGHT OR  
23 OPPORTUNITY TO LITIGATE DISPUTES THROUGH A COURT AND HAVE  
24 A JUDGE OR JURY DECIDE THE DISPUTES BUT HAVE AGREED INSTEAD  
25 TO RESOLVE DISPUTES THROUGH BINDING ARBITRATION.” App’x at 168.

26 The other applications Moss signed contained similar arbitration clauses.

1 Moss filed a putative class action against First Premier Bank and Bay Cities  
2 Bank in federal court, alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and  
3 Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962, and state law. In short, Moss  
4 alleged that the banks unlawfully facilitated high-interest payday loans that have  
5 been outlawed in several states.

6 The banks moved to compel arbitration on the basis of the arbitration  
7 agreements that Moss signed when she applied for the loans. Although the banks  
8 were not parties to those agreements, they argued that they were entitled to  
9 enforce the agreements against Moss under principles of estoppel. The district  
10 court agreed and initially granted the banks' motion to compel arbitration and  
11 stayed the proceedings.

12 After the district court ordered the parties to arbitrate, Moss sent a letter to  
13 NAF indicating her intent to arbitrate her claims. NAF responded that it was  
14 unable to accept Moss's dispute pursuant to a consent judgment that it had  
15 entered into with the Minnesota Attorney General. In 2009, the Minnesota  
16 Attorney General had sued NAF for consumer fraud, deceptive trade practices,  
17 and false advertising. The complaint alleged that, although NAF represented  
18 itself as an independent and impartial arbiter, the forum was in fact "work[ing]

1 alongside creditors behind the scenes . . . to convince [them] to place mandatory  
2 pre-dispute arbitration clauses in their customer agreements and to appoint  
3 [NAF] as the arbitrator of any disputes that may arise in the future.” App’x at  
4 455-56. NAF also allegedly “ma[de] representations that align[ed] itself against  
5 consumers” to solicit creditors to use its arbitration services. App’x at 457. To  
6 settle the lawsuit, NAF entered into a consent decree that prohibited it from  
7 accepting consumer arbitrations such as Moss’s.

8         After NAF declined to accept her dispute, Moss returned to federal court  
9 and moved to vacate the district court’s order compelling arbitration, arguing  
10 that she could not arbitrate her claims because NAF declined to arbitrate her  
11 case. The district court granted the motion. *See Moss v. BMO Harris Bank, N.A.*,  
12 114 F. Supp. 3d 61, 63 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). The court concluded that the language of  
13 the arbitration agreements reflected the parties’ intent to arbitrate exclusively  
14 before NAF. *Id.* at 66. The court further concluded that, under this Court’s  
15 decision in *In re Salomon Inc. Shareholders’ Derivative Litigation*, 68 F.3d 554 (2d Cir.  
16 1995), a district court may not appoint a substitute arbitrator under such  
17 circumstances. *Moss*, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 66. The court vacated its prior order and  
18 lifted its stay of the proceedings, holding that Moss “cannot be compelled to

1 arbitrate her claims against Bay Cities Bank and First Premier Bank.” *Id.* at 68.

2 This appeal followed.

### 3 DISCUSSION

4 We have jurisdiction to review an order “refusing a stay of any action  
5 under section 3” of the Federal Arbitration Act. 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(A). Here, the  
6 order appealed from lifted a prior stay under Section 3 and vacated a prior order  
7 compelling arbitration. Because the order appealed from “was effectively one  
8 ‘refusing a stay,’” we have jurisdiction to review it. *Pre-Paid Legal Servs., Inc. v.*  
9 *Cahill*, 786 F.3d 1287, 1290 (10th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 136 S. Ct. 373 (2015); *see also*  
10 *Dobbins v. Hawk’s Enters.*, 198 F.3d 715, 716 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that court had  
11 jurisdiction to review order lifting stay of arbitration because it was an “order  
12 refusing to compel arbitration”); *Corpman v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc.*, 907 F.2d  
13 29, 30 (3d Cir. 1990) (same). We review the district court’s order de novo. *See*  
14 *Mediterranean Shipping Co. S.A. Geneva v. POL-Atl.*, 229 F.3d 397, 402 (2d Cir.  
15 2000).

16 Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides that “[a] written  
17 provision in . . . a contract . . . to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter

1 arising out of such contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.”

2 9 U.S.C. § 2.

3 This text reflects the overarching principle that arbitration is a  
4 matter of contract. And consistent with that text, courts must  
5 rigorously enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms,  
6 including terms that specify with whom the parties choose to  
7 arbitrate their disputes and the rules under which that arbitration  
8 will be conducted.

9 *Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest.*, 570 U.S. \_\_\_, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013)

10 (alterations, emphasis, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). As with

11 any contract, “the parties’ intentions control.” *Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds*

12 *Int’l Corp.*, 559 U.S. 662, 682 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). To discern

13 the parties’ intentions, we look to the language of the agreement. *PaineWebber Inc.*

14 *v. Bybyk*, 81 F.3d 1193, 1199 (2d Cir. 1996).

15 The arbitration agreement in this case provides that any disputes shall be

16 resolved “by binding individual (and not joint) arbitration by and under the

17 Code of Procedure of the National Arbitration Forum (“NAF”) in effect at the

18 time the claim is filed.” App’x at 168. The agreement does not address how the

19 parties should proceed in the event that NAF is unable to accept the dispute. The



1 question is whether a court may compel arbitration when the designated  
2 arbitrator is unavailable.

3 We addressed that question in *In re Salomon Inc. Shareholders' Derivative*  
4 *Litigation*, 68 F.3d 554 (2d Cir. 1995). There, a group of shareholders brought a  
5 derivative suit against former executives of Salomon Brothers. *Id.* at 555. The  
6 executives had signed arbitration agreements with Salomon Brothers providing  
7 that "any controversy . . . arising out of [the employee's] employment . . . shall be  
8 settled by arbitration at the instance of any such party in accordance with the  
9 Constitution and rules then obtaining of the [New York Stock Exchange]." *Id.* at  
10 558. The executives moved to compel arbitration, and the district court granted  
11 the motion, referring the matter to the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"). *Id.* at  
12 555. NYSE declined to arbitrate the dispute, invoking its discretion under its  
13 constitution to decline to arbitrate cases referred to it. *Id.* at 555-56. The  
14 executives then returned to the district court and requested that the court  
15 appoint a substitute arbitrator pursuant to Section 5. *Id.* at 557. The court denied  
16 the motion. *Id.*

17 We affirmed. We held that where "the parties ha[ve] contractually agreed  
18 that *only* [one arbitrator] could arbitrate any disputes between them," a district

1 court must “decline[] to appoint substitute arbitrators and compel arbitration in  
2 another forum.” *Id.* at 559. This is because

3 [a]lthough the federal policy favoring arbitration obliges us to  
4 resolve any doubts in favor of arbitration, we cannot compel a party  
5 to arbitrate a dispute before someone other than the [designated  
6 arbitrator] when that party had agreed to arbitrate disputes only  
7 before the [arbitrator] and the [arbitrator], in turn, exercising its  
8 discretion . . . , has refused . . . to arbitrate the dispute in question.

9 *Id.* at 557-58. Once the designated arbitrator refuses to accept arbitration, there is  
10 “no further promise to arbitrate in another forum.” *Id.* at 557.

11 Thus, under *Salomon*, the question in this case is whether the language of  
12 the parties’ agreement contemplates arbitration before only NAF, or whether it  
13 contemplates the appointment of a substitute arbitrator should NAF become  
14 unavailable. In *Salomon*, we concluded that the parties’ agreement to arbitrate “in  
15 accordance with the Constitution and rules then obtaining of the NYSE” evinced  
16 their intent to “designat[e] . . . an exclusive arbitral forum.” *Id.* at 558, 561  
17 (alteration omitted).

18 The same is true here. The arbitration agreement in this case contains  
19 numerous indicators that the parties contemplated one thing: arbitration before  
20 NAF. The agreement provides that disputes “shall be resolved by binding

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